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ABSTRACT
The Uzawa (1961) theorem applied to finance and growth
suggests that a long-run positive correlation between financial
efficiency and depth is only present when variations in the extent of
access to financial services are considered. Improvements in financial
efficiency can lead to new capital augmenting technologies along the
balanced path, but only improvements in financial efficiency directed
towards labor can change the rate of growth in the long-run. These
findings suggest ways to understand some of the more nuanced
relationships between finance and growth observed in the data and
point in a number of directions for future research.
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1 Introduction
The literature on the relationship between financial development and economic
growth has become one of the most important in applied economics. The early
empirical work of King and Levine (1993a,b) suggested that financial depth is an
important part of what explains variations in growth across countries. The ro-
bustness of that connection has been supported by subsequent studies such as
Demirgu¨c¸-Kunt and Maksimovic (1998), Levine et al. (2000) and Rousseau and
Sylla (2005).1 A number of other results have suggested that the empirical evi-
dence is not consistently positive, however. Important variations have been shown
to exist in the significance and direction of finance-growth connection across coun-
tries (Demetriades and Hussein, 1996), across stages of development (Rioja and
Valev, 2004), and across time (Rousseau and Wachtel, 2010).
The empirical link between financial development and growth has been sup-
ported by the emergence of a theoretical literature on financial intermediation and
endogenous growth. Works such as King and Levine (1993b), de la Fuente and
Mar´ın (1996), Blackburn and Hung (1998) and Aghion et al. (2005) offer a large
number of ways in which financial efficiency can impact on the equilibrium rate of
technological progress and so on long-run growth.2 More recently, Michalopoulos
et al. (2009) have looked to incorporate endogenous financial innovation in a model
of endogenous growth, finding that permanent improvements in financial efficiency
are necessary for positive economic growth to exist in equilibrium.3 While the early
empirical evidence on finance and growth largely used measures of financial depth
as a proxy for financial development, the theoretical literature has focused on the
impact that financial efficiency has on, for example, the ease with which firms can
find good entrepreneurs to fund.
1See Levine (2005) and Beck (2008) for surveys.
2See Capasso (2004) for a survey of the theoretical literature.
3Though, on aggregate, financial efficiency is constant in steady state.
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That focus on the efficiency of intermediation has been driven by the nature
of the endogenous growth framework which places emphasis on that part of the
economy which produces new ideas and new technologies. The complementarity
between the empirical and theoretical findings thus rests upon the implicit assump-
tion that efficiency and depth are both good proxies for the financial development
that matters for economic growth in the long run.
The objective of this paper is to study that connection between financial effi-
ciency and financial depth when the economy is growing in the long-run. That is,
are efficiency and depth positively correlated along a balanced growth path, and
how do they interact when the long-run growth rate changes? This focus on bal-
anced path outcomes leads us also to consider the implications of the Uzawa (1961)
theorem for the way in which financial efficiency can interact with growth over
the long-run; if all technological change must be purely labor-augmenting in the
long-run, what is the implication for how financial efficiency and economic growth
should interact?
In order to address these questions, Section 2 develops a simple neoclassical
model with a role for financial efficiency in determining the level of technological
progress. Using a version of the Uzawa theorem, it becomes clear that balanced
growth restricts both how financial efficiency can relate with financial depth and
how financial efficiency can relate with economic growth. First, sustained growth
cannot come about from sustained progress in financial efficiency if financial ef-
ficiency is related with depth. Second, if financial efficiency is not related with
depth, it can contribute to long-run technological change but only if that progress
in financial efficiency is purely labor augmenting.
Section 3 develops the implications for the efficiency-depth connection in the
context of an endogenous growth model. While depth must be constant along
the balanced growth path, we find that when the growth rate changes depth and
growth must be negatively related. That result is qualified, however, when ‘access’
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to financial intermediation is considered as a part of financial development. The
model suggests that when access is low and growing, a positive correlation between
depth and growth and between efficiency and growth can exist. When access is high
or not growing, the positive relationship between efficiency and growth remains, but
depth and growth can be inversely related. These results relate to some aspects of
the theoretical literature such as Greenwood and Jovanovic (1990) and Rousseau
(1998), but they also give greater force to the importance of a very recent empirical
literature (Beck and Demirgu¨c¸-Kunt, 2008; Kendall et al., 2010) that looks to
measure differences in access to financial services across countries.
Section 4 develops the balanced path implications for finance and growth in the
directed technical change framework with capital and labor. Again, the permanent
technological change which occurs on a balanced growth path must be purely labor
augmenting; only those changes in financial efficiency which impact on the dis-
covery of labor-augmenting technologies can influence the long-run rate of growth.
Changes in financial efficiency toward capital can encourage innovations in capital
augmenting technologies in the short-run, but have no effect on the balanced path
rate of growth.
Section 5 offers some concluding remarks. While this paper principally con-
tributes to our understanding of how finance and growth can interact in theory,
the results point to a number of ways in which the empirical estimation of the
importance of finance might develop.
2 Balanced Growth and Finance
Consider the following neoclassical production function,
Yt = F (Kt, Lt, At(ζt)) (1)
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where capital, Kt, and labor, Lt, combine with a measure of technological progress,
At, to produce output and where F (·) has the usual characteristics, including linear
homogeneity. The parameter ζt denotes financial efficiency, which enters as an input
to the level of technological progress. In theoretical analyses of finance and growth,
something like ζt is generally the object of interest. Exactly how it represents
financial matters and how it enters into At can vary; for the purposes of this model,
we simply assert that greater financial efficiency increases the level of technology,
∂At/∂ζt > 0.
Typically not modelled are the costs associated with that financial efficiency.
Financial intermediary services provide, for example, specialized screening of en-
trepreneurs of unknown type at a cost that reflects the efficiency of finance. When
firms pay those financial intermediaries they allocate resources away from produc-
tion. Financial depth is then the sum of such costs as a proportion of aggregate
output.4 As such, when those costs change, the sum of resources going to financial
services can also change; that is, financial efficiency, financial depth and the level of
technological progress are all connected. While efficiency is exogenous here, we can
see what happens if we permit the connection between the efficiency of financial
services and the sum of resources allocated away from production to be non-zero.
Financial depth so defined enters into the capital accumulation equation as
follows,
K˙t = Yt − Ct −D(ζt)Yt − δKt, (2)
where D(ζt) is financial depth based on the costs of financial services and where
there are no a priori restrictions on D′.
The economy is on a balanced growth path (BGP) after some time τ > 0 if
and only if output, capital, consumption and depth are all positive and all grow at
4This is a more focused definition of depth than tends to be captured in the data, indeed
depth here has to be less than one where it is often not empirically. Clearly, there is a lot in the
empirical measure that is absent here but this conception of financial depth focuses on that part
of finance which is relevant to growth.
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constant exponential rates gy, gk, gc and gd respectively, for all t ≥ τ ,
Yt = Yτe
gy(t−τ), (3)
Kt = Kτe
gk(t−τ), (4)
Ct = Cτe
gc(t−τ), (5)
Dt = Dτe
gd(t−τ). (6)
where Dt is shorthand for D(ζt). Assume that there is no growth in the labor
supply, Lt = L for all t ≥ τ . With the BGP so defined, the first part of the
following proposition makes clear that if financial depth is related with financial
efficiency, then improvements in financial efficiency cannot be a part of what causes
improvements in technology.
Proposition 1 On the BGP, i) financial efficiency cannot cause sustained tech-
nological progress unless it does not interact with financial depth; and, ii), if finan-
cial efficiency contributes to long-run technological change without interacting with
depth, it must be labor-augmenting.
Proof. The proof uses a variant of that of the Uzawa (1961) theorem found in
Schlicht (2006).5 We can re-write (2) for t ≥ τ using the definition of a BGP,
(δ + gk)Kτ = e
(gy−gk)(t−τ)Yτ + e(gy+gd−gk)(t−τ)YτDτ − e(gc−gk)(t−τ)Cτ . (7)
Taking the derivative of (7) with respect to time, we can see that on a BGP,
0 = (gy − gk)e(gy−gk)(t−τ)Yτ + (gy + gd − gk)e(gy+gd−gk)(t−τ)YτDτ +
−(gc − gk)e(gc−gk)(t−τ)Cτ . (8)
If gd + gy = gk then it must be that gy = gc and (gy − gk)(Yτ − Cτ ) = 0 which
5See also Jones and Scrimgeour (2008).
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cannot be true on a BGP since it would imply Kτ < 0. As such, we must have that
Dτ > 0, gd = 0 and that gc = gy = gk ≥ 0.
Consider that technology At augments one or both of the factors of production
with coefficients of technological progressAK,t andAL,t. Then letG(AK,tKt, AL,tLt) :=
F (·). Using homogoneity of the production function, we can write,
Yt = G(e
(gy−gk)(t−τ)Kt, egy(t−τ)L), for any t ≥ τ. (9)
Since gy = gk, equation (9) shows that all technological progress, A˙t/At = gy, is
purely labor-augmenting.
If D′ 6= 0, part i) of the proposition follows from the BGP requirement that
gd = 0. If D
′ = 0, part ii) follows from requirement that technological progress,
including that out of financial efficiency, be Harrod-neutral on BGP.
The proposition has two main implications, one for the relationship between
financial efficiency and depth in an economy on a balanced growth path, another for
the relationship between financial efficiency and technological progress on balanced
growth. Sustained progress in financial efficiency can only be part of technological
change if, first, financial efficiency does not affect financial depth and, second, it
is labor-augmenting. Both of these requirements might be considered somewhat
restrictive. Either way, the implication for financial depth is clear: Away from
balanced growth path depth can vary but in the long-run it must be constant.
Sections 3 and 4 respectively elaborate on each of these two implications in the
context of models of growth where the pace of technological change is endogenous to
both underlying incentives to innovate and the efficiency of financial intermediation.
This permits a more complete specification of the underlying financial problem and
reveals a number of additional insights.
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3 Finance and Endogenous Growth
In models of endogenous growth where financial efficiency matters, intermediaries
exist to screen potential entrepreneurs, to monitor research effort, or to evaluate
the quality of discoveries; that is, they sit between those that wish to acquire new
technologies or blueprints for intermediate goods and those who have the ideas
for those new technologies or blueprints.6 The expanding inputs model recently
exposited in Acemoglu (2009) serves as a useful framework within which to explore
the implications of the Uzawa theorem for finance and growth. That model is
adapted to include a screening problem with which the intermediary can be engaged.
Other features of the model are standard, so we leave some detail to Acemoglu
(2009).
Preferences and technology
The representative household has CRRA preferences, choosing consumption levels
to maximise the present value of discounted future utility,
∫ ∞
0
e−ρt
(
C1−θt − 1
1− θ
)
dt. (10)
Agents consume a perfectly competitive final good, Yt, the production of which
takes a Dixit-Stiglitz form and uses labor, L, and a variety of machines, xt, as
inputs,
Yt =
1
1− β
(∫ Nt
0
xt(v)
1−βdv
)
Lβ, (11)
where v indexes input variety and Nt is the total number of machine input varieties
in existence at time t. The number Nt is thus our measure of the extent of techno-
logical progress. The machines used as inputs to final good production are supplied
by the holders of blueprints for those machines. The discovery of new blueprints
6Consider the screening of entrepreneurial type in King and Levine (1993b) and Morales (2003)
and the monitoring of effort in de la Fuente and Mar´ın (1996) and Blackburn and Hung (1998).
8
requires investment, Zt, in lab equipment. Where Xt =
∫ Nt
0
xt(v)dv is the total
spend on machines in period t, the economy-wide resource constraint is,
Yt ≥ Ct +Xt + Zt. (12)
Technological progress and finance
Lab equipment can itself be of different levels of quality: Capable (incapable) sci-
entists have created good (bad) lab equipment. A proportion φ ∈ (0, 1) of scientists
are capable, the remaining (1−φ) are not. Only by investing in the good equipment,
that created by capable scientists, can new blueprints be discovered.
Machine producers can see who created what equipment but it is infinitely costly
for them to see the type of scientist. Financial intermediaries exist to reveal type
by charging a fee for screening potential researchers.7 The screening mechanism is
perfect (the truth is always known, post-screen), but the efficiency of the screening,
ζt, determines its cost. For a given ζt, the evolution of new blueprints then follows,
N˙t = ηNZt[1− f(ζt)], (13)
where ηN > 0 and f(ζt) is the fee charged for intermediation. The efficiency level
ζt is exogenous but not necessarily constant over time. Financial depth is then,
Dt = f(ζt)ηNZt
Yt
. (14)
The fee charged is based on the screening problem faced by the intermediary.
Intermediaries face a cost z(ζt) > 0 of screening scientists from the pool of ap-
plicants, where z′ < 0. An intermediary chooses the fee that maximises expected
7We are also restricting ourselves throughout to equilibria where [1− f(ζt)] > φ, i.e., where
screening is always better than not screening.
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profits from providing screening services,
E[profit] = φ[fZt − z(ζt)] + (1− φ)[−z(ζt)]. (15)
Assuming competitive intermediation, the fee charged is simply,
f ∗(ζt) =
z(ζt)
φZt
. (16)
Evidently, an increase in financial efficiency will, other things equal, reduce
the fee charged for intermediation, increase the rate of discovery of new blueprints
and decrease the level of financial depth. Despite running counter to evidence,
it is intuitive in a set-up where financial intermediaries do nothing other than
funnel research funding to the right research activities. As such, this implication
is consistent with other finance and endogenous growth models, and Section 3.1
shows that reconciling the efficiency and depth correlation with data requires us to
modify the model only slightly.
Equilibrium and the BGP
Profit maximization by the final goods producer yields the following demands for
machines,
xt(v) = p
x
t (v)
−βL, (17)
where pxt is the machine price set by the blueprint holder.
Let pit(v) ≡ pxt (v)xt(v)−ψxt(v) be the instantaneous profits which accrue from
selling machine variety v at time t. Given that the blueprint owner is a monopolist
in producing the machine variety, the price pxt (v) is chosen to maximise pit(v).
Because the demand for machines is iso-elastic, the price pxt (v) is invariant across
time and machine variety so we normalize the marginal cost of machine production
to ψ = (1 − β). As such, the profit-maximising price is pxt (v) = 1 and monopoly
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profits are pit(v) = βL. The final good production function can then be written as,
Yt =
1
1− βNtL. (18)
Equation (18) implies that any balanced growth equilibrium where Yt grows at a
constant rate will also have that Nt grows at a constant rate.
The net present discounted value of a perpetual license to a blueprint can be
written as,
Vt(v) =
pit(v) + V˙t(v)
rt
, (19)
where rt is the interest rate and V˙t(v) is the change in the net present value of a
blueprint over time (see Acemoglu, 2009).
When there is positive technological progress, free entry to research requires
that one unit of spending on equipment leads to an equal net present discounted
return to the blueprint holder,
[1− f ∗(ζt)]ηNVt(v) = 1. (20)
An economy on a BGP is one where the growth rate of output (and consump-
tion) is constant. Consumer optimization yields,
gc =
C˙t
Ct
=
1
θ
(rt − ρ). (21)
This Euler equation implies that a balanced growth path is characterized by a
constant interest rate. Since profits to blueprint ownership are also constant over
time, it must be that V˙t(v) = 0. Combining this with equations (19) and (20), the
equilibrium interest rate along a BGP is,
r∗ = [1− f ∗(ζt)]ηNβL, (22)
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which makes equilibrium balanced growth rate equal to,
g∗ = θ−1 ([1− f ∗(ζt)]ηNβL− ρ) . (23)
Equation (28) implies that the higher is the efficiency with which financial inter-
mediaries screen scientists, the higher is the equilibrium growth rate.
Financial efficiency and financial depth along the BGP
A direct result of equation (18) is that along a balanced growth path, Nt must
also grows at a constant rate N˙t/Nt = g
∗. We then have the following Proposition,
which is analogous to the first part of Proposition 1,
Proposition 2 Financial depth is constant on a balanced growth equilibrium of the
endogenous growth model.
Proof. The growth rate of new blueprints is,
N˙t
Nt
=
ηN [Zt − z(ζt)/φ]
N
, (24)
which must be a constant on a BGP. Since total spend on machines is Xt = (1 −
β)NtL, the BGP combined with the economy-wide resource constraint implies that
the growth rate of Zt must be constant also which is not possible unless z(ζt) is
proportional to Zt. With z(ζt) proportional to Zt and using equation (16), then
financial depth, equation (14), is a constant on BGP.
Proposition 2 shows that a BGP requires that financial costs as a proportion
of research spending, z(ζt)/Zt, is constant; that is, relative financial efficiency is
constant. This can happen if ζt falls over time in such a way to make z(ζt) increase
along with Zt, but it is more typical for something like ζt itself to reflect that relative
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financial efficiency. As such, let z take the following form,
z(ζt) =
ηZZt
ζt
, (25)
with ηZ > 0. Then the optimal fee charged by intermediaries is constant on BGP,
f ∗(ζt) = ηZ/(φζt).
This analysis provides a justification for focusing on relative financial efficiency,
but it also gives an idea about what must be happening to financial depth along
a balanced growth path. There is, in addition, an implied relationship between
depth and efficiency when the balanced growth path itself changes. Consider, for
example, that relative financial efficiency increases. Since there are no transition
dynamics, the rate of growth of output and consumption along the balanced growth
path immediately increases, but financial depth decreases – though consumption
growth is faster, the resources allocated to finance as a proportion of output are
smaller.
There are a number of problems in contrasting this theoretical depth-efficiency
relationship with the empirical evidence. First, economies are likely not on a bal-
anced growth path a lot of the time and, second, our conception of financial depth
clearly misses out some aspects of that measured in the data. Nonetheless, there
is empirical evidence that shows that the nexus between finance and growth is
not a simple one. The model as laid-out so far suggests that it is not possible to
have anything other than a negative relationship between efficiency and depth on
the balanced growth path. Section 3.1 look at what relaxations of the model are
required in order for different results to exist on a balanced growth path.
3.1 Access to Finance
A number of models of finance and growth consider that a part of financial develop-
ment can be an increase in the number of agents using financial services in addition
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to the efficiency with which they do so. A simple exposition is Townsend (1983),
where development can be characterized as a proportion q of all non-financed agents
being ‘thrown’ into the financial sector at the start of each period. Additionally,
Greenwood and Jovanovic (1990) model the relationship between inequality, growth
and the extent of financial development while Acemoglu and Zilibotti (1997) model
barriers to risk sharing that are progressively overcome through time.
Suppose that only some fraction λt ∈ [0, 1] of scientists are able to be screened,
regardless of their type. The proportion λt affects both the cost of screening and
the rate of new discoveries. First, the larger the pool of scientists (the higher is λt)
among whom the intermediary screens, the more costly it is to screen out incapable
scientists.8 The following formulation simply generalizes (25),
z(ζt, λt) =
λtηZZt
ζt
. (26)
Second, since the rate of increase in new blueprints is limited to that portion which
can be screened by intermediaries, the evolution of blueprints follows,
N˙t = λtηN
(
1− λtηZ
φζt
)
Zt, (27)
and the balanced path rate of growth is,
g∗ = θ−1
[
λtηN
(
1− λtηZ
φζt
)
βL− ρ
]
. (28)
Compared with the model where λt = 1 for all t, the nature of financial develop-
ment along the balanced growth path can be very different. As already established,
along a BGP the ratio Zt/Nt is constant. The effect of an increase in financial effi-
ciency is to speed up the rate of discovery of new blueprints; the effect of increasing
access to financial services is ambiguous, however. Suppose that access and effi-
8For a given amount of research funding to allocate, the higher is λt the more screening the
intermediary is required to do.
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ciency can both change exogenously over time at rates λ˙t and ζ˙t, respectively. The
BGP can then be characterized by Proposition 3.
Proposition 3 On the balanced growth path, financial depth increases at a rate
proportional to that at which access increases.
Proof. The BGP requires that N˙t
Nt
is constant, which implies,
(
1− 2λtηZ
φζt
)
λ˙t = −λ
2
tηZ
φζ2t
ζ˙t. (29)
Financial depth is Dt = λtf(ζt, λt)ηNψ where ϕ = Zt/Yt is the constant share of
output allocated to research. Taking the derivative of depth with respect to time
and using (29), the change of depth on BGP is,
D˙t = ϕηN λ˙t. (30)
Financial depth will grow while the economy is on the BGP if λ˙t > 0.
One solution to (29) is for the BGP to be characterized by no development
in access or efficiency, ζ˙t = λ˙t = 0. However, it is possible to have some forms of
financial development on BGP. If 2λtηZ > φζt, then it is possible to have ζ˙t > 0 and
λ˙t > 0 on the BGP; i.e., depth and efficiency can both be growing on a balanced
growth path. Clearly, there is a limit to this when access becomes high (i.e., close
to λ = 1). Moreover, countries with low (high) access and high (low) efficiency are
less (more) likely to observe 2λtηZ > φζt.
Perhaps more interestingly, consider again what happens when changes in fi-
nancial efficiency and access cause the balanced growth path to change. Suppose
that financial efficiency and access both increase over time, but that the following
holds, (
1− 2λtηZ
φζt
)
λ˙t +
λ2tηZ
φζ2t
ζ˙t = d > 0, (31)
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Where 2λtηZ > φζt, equation (31) implies that the effect of increasing financial
efficiency pushes up the rate of discovery of new blueprints faster than the effect of
increasing access pushes it down. Using (31), the change in depth is simply,
D˙t = ϕηN
(
λ˙t − d
)
. (32)
In other words, when access can change over time as the growth rate of the econ-
omy increases, the correlation between efficiency and depth can be of either sign
depending on the difference between the growth-effects of efficiency and access.
Where λt = 1 it must be that D˙t ≤ 0 and so a positive correlation is not possible.
Incorporating access to finance appears to be an important part of understand-
ing the empirical finding that efficiency, depth and growth are all correlated posi-
tively. The model suggests that when access is low and growing, there is a positive
correlation between depth and growth, and between efficiency and growth. When
access is high or not growing, the positive correlation between efficiency and growth
persists, but a negative correlation between depth and growth can appear. By ap-
preciating the role that access plays, it might be possible to classify particular
empirical results in the light of the data on access to financial services.
4 Directed Technical Change and Financial De-
velopment
The implication of the Uzawa theorem, that all technological progress must be
labor-augmenting in the long run, can be captured in an endogenous growth model
with directed technical change. This section explores the implications of two types
of financial efficiency, one supplementing the discovery of blueprints for labor-
augmenting machines, the other blueprints for capital-augmenting machines. Given
the findings of Section 3, and to simplify the exposition, this section does not con-
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sider long-run change in efficiency in the presence of incomplete access.
While retaining the CRRA preferences specification from Section 3, there are
now two types of intermediate good that go into producing the final good,9
Yt =
[
γL (YL,t)
ε−1
ε + γK (YK,t)
ε−1
ε
] ε
ε−1
, (33)
where YL is the intermediate good produced with labor and YK is that produced
with capital. The parameter ε is the elasticity of substitution between the inter-
mediate goods, so assume throughout that ε < 1. The difference between labor
and capital is that capital can accumulate permanently, whereas the labor supply
is fixed at, L. The structure of each type of intermediate good production follows
the machine-blueprint technology of Section 3,
YL,t =
1
1− β
(∫ NL,t
0
xL,t(v)
1−βdv
)
Lβ (34)
YL,t =
1
1− β
(∫ NK,t
0
xK,t(v)
1−βdv
)
Kβt (35)
where now xL,t(v) is a labor-augmenting machine, and xK,t(v) a capital-augmenting
one. The numbers NL,t and NK,t thus correspond to the extent of progress in labor-
and capital-augmenting technologies.
Financial intermediation again enters into the blueprint discovery sector. Con-
sider that there is full access to financial services (λt = 1) as in the first model of
Section 3, but that there are sector-specific financial efficiencies, ζK,t and ζL,t, that
affect the fees charged for intermediary services in capital- and labor-augmenting
technologies, respectively. In the light of Section 3, assume for simplicity that the
level of financial efficiency is constant in each sector, ζK,t = ζK and ζL,t = ζL.
There exists a fixed pool of scientists, separate from the labor that enters into in-
9Much of this is exposition of a now-familiar framework for understanding directed technical
change, so the model here follows Acemoglu (2009); again, we leave the interested reader to find
details there.
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termediate good production, which can be engaged to discover either capital- or
labor-augmenting blueprints, SL + SK = S,
N˙K,t = ηKNK,t [1− f(ζK)]SK (36)
N˙L,t = ηLNL,t [1− f(ζL)]SL (37)
The resource constraint in the economy is,
Yt ≥ Ct +Xt + It, (38)
where It is capital investment, and Xt is now the sum of spending on all types of
machines. Following Acemoglu (2003), capital accumulates without depreciating,
K˙t = It. (39)
Solving for intermediate demands and the value of holding a blueprint in each
sector follows as previously, but now equilibrium in the R&D sector depends upon
relative factor supplies. First, the free-entry requirement for blueprints implies,
ωS,t = ηL [1− f(ζL)]NL,tVL,t = ηK [1− f(ζK)]NK,tVK,t (40)
where ωS,t is the wage rate of scientists and, using same argument as above, VL =
piL,t/rt and VK = piK,t/rt where rt is the interest rate. Again normalizing the
marginal cost of machine production, the prices of machines are unity and profits are
a function of the prices of the intermediate goods, piL,t = βp
1/β
L,t L and piK,t = βp
1/β
K,tK.
The relative intermediate prices are,
pK
pL
=
(
γK
γL
) εβ
σ
(
NK,tKt
NL,tL
)−β
σ
(41)
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where σ ≡ 1 + (ε − 1)β is the elasticity of substitution between capital and labor
(and, since ε < 1, it is the case that σ < 1). With the free-entry condition, we
arrive at the equilibrium relative technology levels along a BGP,
(
NK
NL
)∗
=
[
ηK [1− f(ζK)]
ηL [1− f(ζL)]
]− σ
σ−1
(
γK
γL
)− ε
σ−1
(
Kt
L
)−1
(42)
Capital deepening means that technical change is relatively more labor-augmenting
along the balanced growth path.
It can be shown that the BGP interest rate reduces to,
rt = βγKNK,t
[
γL
(
ηK [1− f(ζK)]
ηL [1− f(ζL)]
)(
γK
γL
) ε
σ
+ γK
] 1
σ−1
. (43)
By the Euler equation along a BGP it must be that r is constant. As such, where
ζL and ζK are constant, it is the case that all technological progress must be labor-
augmenting in the long-run; N˙K,t/NK,t = 0 and N˙L,t/NL,t = K˙t/Kt.
Given that the only BGP equilibrium is one with purely Harrod-neutral tech-
nological change, it must be that S = SL. The rate of growth along the balanced
path is then simply,
g∗ = ηL [1− f(ζL)]S. (44)
So, from the Euler equation, in equilibrium the interest rate is r∗ = ρ+ θg∗. Since
the growth rate, (44), is invariant to ζK , it must be that the equilibrium interest
rate is also invariant to ζK .
Proposition 4 Labor augmenting financial efficiency cannot change along a BGP;
capital augmenting financial efficiency can.
Proof. Clearly ζL cannot change by itself along a BGP. Equation (43) shows that
ζK and ζL can vary in opposite directions such that rt is constant, but (44) shows
that g∗ has to change nevertheless since only ζL enters into the BGP rate of growth.
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When g∗ changes, r∗ must change also. If ζK changes holding ζL constant, g∗ and
r∗ are unaffected but (42) implies that (NK/NL)
∗ increases at the point in time
when ζK changes. The model is stable where σ < 1 in the sense that starting with
some (NK,t/NL,t) 6= (NK/NL)∗ the economy will converge to the BGP equilibrium
(see Acemoglu, 2009).
The permanent technological progress that occurs along a BGP must be purely
labor-augmenting. That means that labor-augmenting financial efficiency cannot
change along a BGP, but it also means that only labor-augmenting financial effi-
ciency can influence the long-run rate of growth.
Despite that, the model contains interesting implications for capital-augmenting
financial efficiency. Because σ < 1, increasing ζK means, by equation (43), that the
number of capital augmenting blueprints must also increase for r∗ to remain con-
stant in the long run, i.e., NK must increase. So while technological progress is still
purely labor-augmenting in the long-run, there can be capital-augmenting technical
progress in response to changes in financial efficiency toward capital. In transition
to the new the BGP, there will be some SK > 0 allocated to discovering new capital-
augmenting blueprints. In other words, the appearance of technological progress in
response to an increase in financial efficiency in the capital sector has, in the long-
run, no effect on balanced growth. Because growth is purely labor-augmenting, the
financial efficiency which enters into the discovery of capital-augmenting blueprints
can vary along a constant BGP, but cannot change what that BGP is.
5 Concluding Remarks
A variant of the Uzawa theorem permits us to qualify the generally assumed comple-
mentarity between empirical and theoretical results on finance and growth. Along
a constant growth path, a long-run positive correlation between financial efficiency
and depth is present only when we consider that access to financial services can
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vary. Moreover, the ways in which efficiency and depth can be related when the
long-run growth rate changes are also limited: A positive relationship between
growth, efficiency and depth is only observed when access to financial services is
increasing from a low level.
The results point in a number of potentially fruitful research directions. The
importance of access in explaining a positive correlation between efficiency and
depth suggests one route to a more nuanced understanding of the ways in which
finance can matter for growth. Data such as Kendall et al. (2010) which measures
access to finance across countries is well placed to enable such research. The im-
portance of a distinction between financial efficiency which separately benefit the
discovery of capital- and labor-augmenting technologies also suggests directions for
future theoretical and empirical research. Models in which the direction of finan-
cial innovation matters could follow from work such as Michalopoulos et al. (2009),
and might lead to a richer understanding of the nature of financial development in
economies which go through a period of takeoff in long-run growth.
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